| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16282 |
| DP16282 When Bonuses Backfire: Evidence from the Workplace | |
| Dirk Sliwka; Timo Vogelsang; Jakob Alfitian | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-06-21 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Monetary incentives are widely used to align employees’ actions with the objectives of employers. We conduct a field experiment in a retail chain to evaluate whether an attendance bonus reduces employee absenteeism. The RCT assigned 346 apprentices for one year to either a monetary attendance bonus, a time-off bonus or a control group. We find that neither form of the bonus reduced absenteeism, but the monetary bonus increased absence by around 45%. This backfiring effect is persistent and driven by the most recently hired apprentices. Survey results reveal that the bonus shifted the perception of absenteeism as acceptable behavior. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Compensation Monetary incentives Time-off incentive Absenteeism Crowding-out Field experiment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16282 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545248 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dirk Sliwka,Timo Vogelsang,Jakob Alfitian. DP16282 When Bonuses Backfire: Evidence from the Workplace. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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