| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16288 |
| DP16288 Contract Length and Severance Pay | |
| Vladimir Vladimirov | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-06-24 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Renewable fixed-term contracts are widespread in executive compensation. This paper studies why these contracts are optimal, what determines their length, and how that length affects managerial behavior. The model relates a contract's length to the period during which dismissing a manager triggers severance pay. Though longer contracts are more costly to terminate, their severance protection can discourage managers from trying to avoid replacement through window dressing or concealing soft information. Thus, the board's choice of contract length balances higher replacement costs with a higher likelihood of window dressing. The predicted determinants of contract length and severance pay are supported empirically. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Contract length Contract horizon Severance pay Renewable fixed-term contracts Voluntary and forced turnover Turnover-performance sensitivity Asymmetric information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16288 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545253 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vladimir Vladimirov. DP16288 Contract Length and Severance Pay. 2021. |
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