| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16300 |
| DP16300 Bank Compensation for Penalty-Free Loan Prepayment: Theory and Tests | |
| Karin S. Thorburn; B Espen Eckbo; Xunhua Su | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-06-27 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | While institutional tranches in term loans typically include a cancellation fee, commercial banks allow penalty-free prepayment in 90% of their tranche-A loan facilities. We show that compensating banks for a penalty-free prepayment option by raising the initial loan rate increases the prepayment risk and may result in credit rationing. However, combining a lower loan rate with an upfront fee allows the bank to break even. Empirically, upfront fees increase in prepayment risk and are lower in credit lines and performance-sensitive debt, as predicted. Moreover, high industry merger intensity, which exogenously increases prepayment risk, further raises the upfront fee. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Credit rationing Upfront fee Prepayment risk Performance-pricing Cancellation fee |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16300 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545265 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Karin S. Thorburn,B Espen Eckbo,Xunhua Su. DP16300 Bank Compensation for Penalty-Free Loan Prepayment: Theory and Tests. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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