G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16305
DP16305 Investment in Human Capital under Endogenous Asymmetric Information
Heski Bar-Isaac; Clare Leaver
发表日期2021-06-28
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要When is general training under-provided? We study this classic question in a model of a competitive labour market. Workers vary in firm-specific and general skills. Firms’ choices of information disclosure play a key role. Disclosing general human capital information on bad matches, but revealing nothing about good matches, leads to an efficient allocation of workers. This also creates adverse selection that enables workers to pay for efficient training. This information structure resembles the outplacement support commonly found in professional services firms. Moreover, it implies that wages of released workers can be higher than wages of those who are retained.
主题Labour Economics ; Organizational Economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16305
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545270
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Heski Bar-Isaac,Clare Leaver. DP16305 Investment in Human Capital under Endogenous Asymmetric Information. 2021.
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