| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16305 |
| DP16305 Investment in Human Capital under Endogenous Asymmetric Information | |
| Heski Bar-Isaac; Clare Leaver | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-06-28 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When is general training under-provided? We study this classic question in a model of a competitive labour market. Workers vary in firm-specific and general skills. Firms’ choices of information disclosure play a key role. Disclosing general human capital information on bad matches, but revealing nothing about good matches, leads to an efficient allocation of workers. This also creates adverse selection that enables workers to pay for efficient training. This information structure resembles the outplacement support commonly found in professional services firms. Moreover, it implies that wages of released workers can be higher than wages of those who are retained. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Organizational Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16305 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545270 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Heski Bar-Isaac,Clare Leaver. DP16305 Investment in Human Capital under Endogenous Asymmetric Information. 2021. |
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