| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16308 |
| DP16308 Optimal Feedback in Contests | |
| Jeffrey Ely; George Georgiadis; Sina Khorasani; Luis Rayo | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-06-29 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We derive an optimal dynamic contest for environments where the principal monitors effort through a coarse, binary performance measure and chooses prize-allocation and termination rules together with a real-time feedback policy. The optimal contest takes a stark cyclical form: contestants are kept fully apprised of their own successes, and at the end of each fixed-length cycle, if at least one agent has succeeded, the contest ends and the prize is shared equally among all successful agents regardless of when they succeeded; otherwise, the designer informs all contestants that nobody has yet succeeded and the contest resets. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16308 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545273 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeffrey Ely,George Georgiadis,Sina Khorasani,et al. DP16308 Optimal Feedback in Contests. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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