G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16308
DP16308 Optimal Feedback in Contests
Jeffrey Ely; George Georgiadis; Sina Khorasani; Luis Rayo
发表日期2021-06-29
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要We derive an optimal dynamic contest for environments where the principal monitors effort through a coarse, binary performance measure and chooses prize-allocation and termination rules together with a real-time feedback policy. The optimal contest takes a stark cyclical form: contestants are kept fully apprised of their own successes, and at the end of each fixed-length cycle, if at least one agent has succeeded, the contest ends and the prize is shared equally among all successful agents regardless of when they succeeded; otherwise, the designer informs all contestants that nobody has yet succeeded and the contest resets.
主题Organizational Economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16308
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545273
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jeffrey Ely,George Georgiadis,Sina Khorasani,et al. DP16308 Optimal Feedback in Contests. 2021.
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