| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16309 |
| DP16309 Shareholder Liability and Bank Failure | |
| Dirk Jenter; Felipe Aldunate; Arthur Korteweg; Peter Koudijs | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-06-29 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Does enhanced shareholder liability reduce bank failure? We compare the performance of around 4,200 state-regulated banks of similar size in neighboring U.S. states with different liability regimes during the Great Depression. The distress rate of limited liability banks was 29% higher than that of banks with enhanced liability. Results are robust to a diff-in-diff analysis incorporating nationally-regulated banks (which faced the same regulations everywhere) and are not driven by other differences in state regulations, Fed membership, local characteristics, or differential selection into state-regulated banks. Our results suggest that exposing shareholders to more downside risk can successfully reduce bank failure. |
| 主题 | Economic History ; Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Limited liability Bank risk taking Financial crises Great depression |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16309 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545274 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dirk Jenter,Felipe Aldunate,Arthur Korteweg,et al. DP16309 Shareholder Liability and Bank Failure. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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