| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16320 |
| DP16320 Quick or Broad Patents? Evidence from U.S. Startups | |
| Alexander Ljungqvist; Deepak Hegde; Manav Raj | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-07-02 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effects of patent scope and review times on startups and externalities on their rivals. We leverage the quasi-random assignment of U.S. patent applications to examiners and find that grant delays reduce a startup’s employment and sales growth, chances of survival, access to external capital, and future innovation. Delays also harm the growth, access to external capital, and follow-on innovation of the patentee’s rivals, suggesting that quick patents enhance both inventor rewards and generate positive externalities. Broader scope increases a startup’s future growth (conditional on survival) and innovation but imposes negative externalities on its rivals’ growth. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Patents Innovation Scope entrepreneurship Venture capital |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16320 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545285 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexander Ljungqvist,Deepak Hegde,Manav Raj. DP16320 Quick or Broad Patents? Evidence from U.S. Startups. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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