G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16326
DP16326 Bargaining over Treatment Choice under Disagreement
Nabil I. Al-Najjar; Robert J. Gary-Bobo
发表日期2021-07-05
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要A group of experts with different prior beliefs must choose a treatment. A dataset is made public and leads to revisions of beliefs. We propose a model where the experts' disagreements are resolved through bargaining, using the Nash bargaining solution. Experts bargain after disclosure of the dataset. Bargaining may lead to an inefficient use of information in a strong sense: experts receive a lower payoff in every state, and for any prior belief (i.e., inadmissibility). Bargaining exhibits under-reaction to information as compared to the normative solution in which experts bargain ex ante on the procedure used to exploit the data.
主题Organizational Economics ; Public Economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16326
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545290
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Nabil I. Al-Najjar,Robert J. Gary-Bobo. DP16326 Bargaining over Treatment Choice under Disagreement. 2021.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Nabil I. Al-Najjar]的文章
[Robert J. Gary-Bobo]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Nabil I. Al-Najjar]的文章
[Robert J. Gary-Bobo]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Nabil I. Al-Najjar]的文章
[Robert J. Gary-Bobo]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。