| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16326 |
| DP16326 Bargaining over Treatment Choice under Disagreement | |
| Nabil I. Al-Najjar; Robert J. Gary-Bobo | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-07-05 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A group of experts with different prior beliefs must choose a treatment. A dataset is made public and leads to revisions of beliefs. We propose a model where the experts' disagreements are resolved through bargaining, using the Nash bargaining solution. Experts bargain after disclosure of the dataset. Bargaining may lead to an inefficient use of information in a strong sense: experts receive a lower payoff in every state, and for any prior belief (i.e., inadmissibility). Bargaining exhibits under-reaction to information as compared to the normative solution in which experts bargain ex ante on the procedure used to exploit the data. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16326 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545290 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nabil I. Al-Najjar,Robert J. Gary-Bobo. DP16326 Bargaining over Treatment Choice under Disagreement. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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