| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16342 |
| DP16342 On the Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium with and without Market Makers | |
| James Albrecht; Xiaoming Cai; Pieter A. Gautier; Susan Vroman | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-07-07 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The literature offers two foundations for competitive search equilibrium, a Nash approach and a market-maker approach. When each buyer visits only one seller (or each worker makes only one job application), the two approaches are equivalent. However, when each buyer visits multiple sellers, this equivalence can break down. Our paper analyzes competitive search equilibrium with simultaneous search using the two approaches. We consider four cases defined by (i) the surplus structure (are the goods substitutes or complements?) and (ii) the mechanism space (do sellers post fees or prices?). With fees, the two approaches yield the same constrained efficient equilibrium. With prices, the equilibrium allocation is the same using both approaches if the goods are complements, but is not constrained efficient. In the case in which only prices are posted and the goods are substitutes, the equilibrium allocations from the two approaches are different. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Multiple applications Competitive search Market makers Efficiency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16342 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545306 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James Albrecht,Xiaoming Cai,Pieter A. Gautier,et al. DP16342 On the Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium with and without Market Makers. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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