| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16349 |
| DP16349 Multigame contact and cooperation | |
| João Montez; Vincent Laferrière; Christian Thoeni; Catherine Roux | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-07-09 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Many strategic situations involve players repeatedly interacting across multiple games. While there is an extensive experimental literature on the determinants of cooperation in indefinitely repeated games, there is no evidence on how multigame contact affects behavior in these games. In theory, multigame contact should foster cooperation by improving players' ability to punish. We study the effect of multigame contact on cooperation in two preregistered laboratory experiments, where the main treatment consists of subjects playing a pair of indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas with either the same partner or with different partners, i.e., respectively with and without multigame contact. In contrast to the theoretical predictions, we find no evidence that multigame contact increases average cooperation rates. Yet, and now in line with theory, we observe that multigame contact has systematic effects on behavior: subjects often link the strategies in the two games when they play with the same partner. Such linkage turns out to be a double-edged sword: while it helps subjects reaching cooperation in both games, it makes cooperation in only one of the games less likely. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Cooperation Repeated games Prisoner’s dilemma Multigame contact Experiment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16349 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545313 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | João Montez,Vincent Laferrière,Christian Thoeni,et al. DP16349 Multigame contact and cooperation. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
