| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16393 |
| DP16393 Algorithmic collusion, genuine and spurious | |
| Emilio Calvano; Giacomo Calzolari; Vincenzo Denicolò; Sergio Pastorello | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-07-25 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We clarify the difference between the asynchronous pricing algorithms analyzed by Asker, Fershtman and Pakes (2021) and those considered in the previous literature. The difference lies in the way the algorithms explore: randomly or mechanically. We reaffirm that with random exploration, asynchronous pricing algorithms learn genuinely collusive strategies. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Artificial intelligence Reinforcement learning Collusion Exploration |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16393 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545354 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emilio Calvano,Giacomo Calzolari,Vincenzo Denicolò,et al. DP16393 Algorithmic collusion, genuine and spurious. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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