全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP16394 The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP16394
	DP16394 The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing
	Dirk Bergemann; Alessandro Bonatti; Andreas Haupt; Alex Smolin
发表日期	2021-07-25
出版年	2021
语种	英语
摘要	We consider a multiproduct monopoly pricing model. We provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal mechanism can be implemented via upgrade pricing—a menu of product bundles that are nested in the strong set order. Our approach exploits duality methods to identify conditions on the distribution of consumer types under which (a) each product is purchased by the same set of buyers as under separate monopoly pricing (though the transfers can be different), and (b) these sets are nested. We exhibit two distinct sets of sufficient conditions. The first set of conditions weakens the monotonicity requirement of types and virtual values but maintains a regularity assumption, i.e., that the product-by-product revenue curves are single-peaked. The second set of conditions establishes the optimality of upgrade pricing for type spaces with monotone marginal rates of substitution (MRS)—the relative preference ratios for any two products are monotone across types. The monotone MRS condition allows us to relax the earlier regularity assumption. Under both sets of conditions, we fully characterize the product bundles and prices that form the optimal upgrade pricing menu. Finally, we show that, if the consumer’s types are monotone, the seller can equivalently post a vector of single-item prices: upgrade pricing and separate pricing are equivalent.
主题	Industrial Organization
关键词	Revenue maximization Mechanism design Strong duality Upgrade pricing
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp16394-0
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545355
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Dirk Bergemann,Alessandro Bonatti,Andreas Haupt,et al. DP16394 The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing. 2021.