G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16399
DP16399 On the Dynamics of Technology Transfer
Nikolaos Vettas; Frago Kourandi; Sabina Sachtachtinskagia
发表日期2021-07-26
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要We study the strategic timing and pace of cost reducing technology transfer by an upstream monopolist to a downstream market when there is potential competition downstream and the protection of intellectual property rights is imperfect. The possibility that the downstream firm may not fully compensate the upstream firm for the benefits that it has received, creates "hold- up" issues. In equilibrium transfer occurs to the same downstream firm in both periods, however the contractual relationship is crucially affected by the presence of competitors - in particular, there is a delay in technology transfer, relative to the vertical integration benchmark. The upstream firm is trying to limit the downstream firm's bargaining power, in an effort to pay lower rent or no rent in the subsequent period. Price competition downstream does not fully eliminate the opportunistic behavior created by the imperfect intellectual property rights.
主题Industrial Organization ; Organizational Economics
关键词Technology transfer Vertical contracts Hold-up
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16399
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545360
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Nikolaos Vettas,Frago Kourandi,Sabina Sachtachtinskagia. DP16399 On the Dynamics of Technology Transfer. 2021.
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