全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP16400 Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP16400
	DP16400 Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods
	Kevin Bauer; Michael Kosfeld; Ferdinand Von Siemens
发表日期	2021-07-26
出版年	2021
语种	英语
摘要	We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of a social good with positive effort complementarities (social effort). Agents differ in their motivation to exert social effort. Our model predicts that lowering incentives for selfish effort in one team increases social good production by selectively attracting and coordinating motivated agents. We test this prediction in a lab experiment allowing us to cleanly separate the selection effect from other effects of low incentives. Results show that social good production more than doubles in the low- incentive team, but only if self-selection is possible. Our analysis highlights the important role of incentives in the matching of motivated agents engaged in social good production.
主题	Organizational Economics
关键词	Incentives Intrinsic motivation Self-selection Public service
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp16400
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545361
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Kevin Bauer,Michael Kosfeld,Ferdinand Von Siemens. DP16400 Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods. 2021.