G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16400
DP16400 Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods
Kevin Bauer; Michael Kosfeld; Ferdinand Von Siemens
发表日期2021-07-26
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of a social good with positive effort complementarities (social effort). Agents differ in their motivation to exert social effort. Our model predicts that lowering incentives for selfish effort in one team increases social good production by selectively attracting and coordinating motivated agents. We test this prediction in a lab experiment allowing us to cleanly separate the selection effect from other effects of low incentives. Results show that social good production more than doubles in the low- incentive team, but only if self-selection is possible. Our analysis highlights the important role of incentives in the matching of motivated agents engaged in social good production.
主题Organizational Economics
关键词Incentives Intrinsic motivation Self-selection Public service
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16400
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545361
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Kevin Bauer,Michael Kosfeld,Ferdinand Von Siemens. DP16400 Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods. 2021.
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