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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP16400 |
DP16400 Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods | |
Kevin Bauer; Michael Kosfeld; Ferdinand Von Siemens | |
发表日期 | 2021-07-26 |
出版年 | 2021 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of a social good with positive effort complementarities (social effort). Agents differ in their motivation to exert social effort. Our model predicts that lowering incentives for selfish effort in one team increases social good production by selectively attracting and coordinating motivated agents. We test this prediction in a lab experiment allowing us to cleanly separate the selection effect from other effects of low incentives. Results show that social good production more than doubles in the low- incentive team, but only if self-selection is possible. Our analysis highlights the important role of incentives in the matching of motivated agents engaged in social good production. |
主题 | Organizational Economics |
关键词 | Incentives Intrinsic motivation Self-selection Public service |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16400 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545361 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kevin Bauer,Michael Kosfeld,Ferdinand Von Siemens. DP16400 Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods. 2021. |
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