G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16402
DP16402 Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition
Dirk Bergemann; Tibor Heumann; Stephen Morris
发表日期2021-07-27
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要In digital advertising, a publisher selling impressions faces a trade-off in deciding how precisely to match advertisers with viewers. A more precise match generates efficiency gains that the publisher can hope to exploit. A coarser match will generate a thicker market and thus more competition. The publisher can control the precision of the match by controlling the amount of information that advertisers have about viewers. We characterize the optimal trade-off when impressions are sold by auction. The publisher pools premium matches for advertisers (when there will be less competition on average) but gives advertisers full information about lower quality matches.
主题Industrial Organization ; Organizational Economics
关键词Econd price auction Conflation Digital advertising Impressions Bayesian persuasion Information design
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16402
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545363
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Dirk Bergemann,Tibor Heumann,Stephen Morris. DP16402 Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition. 2021.
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