| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16433 |
| DP16433 When Is (Performance-Sensitive) Debt Optimal? | |
| Alex Edmans | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-08-08 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Existing theories of debt consider a single contractible performance measure ("output"). In reality, many other performance signals are also available. It may seem that debt is no longer optimal; for example, if the signals are sufficiently positive, the agent should receive a payment even if output is low. This paper shows that debt remains the optimal contract under additional signals -- they only affect the face value of debt, but not the form of the contract. We show how the face value should depend on other signals, providing a theory of performance-sensitive debt. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Informativeness principle Limited liability Performance-sensitive debt |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16433 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545394 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alex Edmans. DP16433 When Is (Performance-Sensitive) Debt Optimal?. 2021. |
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