G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16458
DP16458 Counterparty Choice, Bank Interconnectedness, and Systemic Risk
Andrew Ellul; Dasol Kim
发表日期2021-08-16
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要We provide evidence on how banks form network connections and endogenous risk-taking in their non-bank counterparty choices in the OTC derivative markets. We use confidential regulatory data from the Capital Assessment and Stress Testing reports that provide counterparty-level data across a wide range of OTC markets for the most systemically important U.S. banks. We show that banks are more likely to either establish or maintain a relationship, and increase their exposures within an existing relationship, with non-bank counterparties that are already heavily connected and exposed to other banks. Banks in such densely-connected networks are more likely to connect with riskier counterparties for their most material exposures. The effects are strongest in the case of (non-bank) financial counterparties. These findings suggest moral hazard behavior in counterparty choices. Finally, we demonstrate that these exposures are strongly linked to systemic risk. Overall, the results suggest a network formation process that amplifies risk propagation through non-bank linkages in opaque financial markets.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Counterparty risk Financial networks Bank interconnectedness Over-the-counter markets Derivatives
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16458
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545416
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Andrew Ellul,Dasol Kim. DP16458 Counterparty Choice, Bank Interconnectedness, and Systemic Risk. 2021.
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