| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16472 |
| DP16472 Collective Action and Intra-group Conflict with Fixed Budgets | |
| Kai Konrad; Florian Morath | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-08-19 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study collective action under adverse incentives: each member of the group has a given budget ('use-it-or-lose-it') that is his private information and that can be used for contributions to make the group win a prize and for internal fights about this very prize. Even in the face of such rivalry in resource use, the group often succeeds to overcome the collective action problem in non-cooperative equilibrium. One type of equilibrium has group members who both contribute, the other type has volunteers who make full stand-alone contributions. Both types of equilibrium exist for larger and partially overlapping parameter ranges. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Blotto budgets Intra-group conflict Threshold public good Collective action All-pay auction Incomplete information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16472 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545430 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kai Konrad,Florian Morath. DP16472 Collective Action and Intra-group Conflict with Fixed Budgets. 2021. |
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