G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16475
DP16475 Networks and Manager Pay: Evidence from Time-Varying Exogenous Metrics
José Tavares; Sharmin Sazedj
发表日期2021-08-20
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要In this paper we assess the quantitative impact of a top manager’s network on pay, using a novel dataset that comprehends the entire career of top managers for the universe of business firms in Portugal. We construct 5 different network metrics that are sensitive to exogenous variation. Further, we analyze these metrics using high dimensional fixed effects models and instrumental variable procedures to address thoroughly endogeneity concerns. We confirm that networks are associated to higher manager pay, both base wage and bonus. A one standard deviation increase in the number of connections is associated to a 8% higher bonus and 5% higher total pay. The depth of the connections prevails over mere number, while indirect measures capturing the information value of networks also matter. Finally, well connected managers that have access to private information not only further their career options and their bargaining power, they also benefit the firm. In other words, our results suggest that, from the firm’s perspective, productivity gains associated to large-network managers go beyond the pay premium, so that networks are not overpaid.
主题Organizational Economics
关键词Manager pay Networks Rent extraction Productivity
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16475
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545433
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
José Tavares,Sharmin Sazedj. DP16475 Networks and Manager Pay: Evidence from Time-Varying Exogenous Metrics. 2021.
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