| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16481 |
| DP16481 Cartels and Bribes | |
| Roberto Burguet; Elisabetta Iossa; Giancarlo Spagnolo | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-08-25 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. Cooperation among honest suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest bureaucrats, generating a trade-off between collusion and corruption. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Bribes Cartels Corruption Free-riding Whistle-blowing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16481 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545438 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roberto Burguet,Elisabetta Iossa,Giancarlo Spagnolo. DP16481 Cartels and Bribes. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
