| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16491 |
| DP16491 Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities | |
| Pietro Ortoleva; Evgenii Safonov; Leeat Yariv | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-08-28 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Goods and services---public housing, medical appointments, schools---are often allocated to individuals who rank them similarly but differ in their preference intensities. We characterize optimal allocation rules when individual preferences are known and when they are not. Several insights emerge. First-best allocations may involve assigning some agents "lotteries" between high- and low-ranked goods. When preference intensities are private information, second-best allocations always involve such lotteries and, crucially, may coincide with first-best allocations. Furthermore, second-best allocations may entail disposal of services. We discuss a market-based alternative and show how it differs. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Organizational Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Market design Mechanism design Allocation problems |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16491 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545447 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pietro Ortoleva,Evgenii Safonov,Leeat Yariv. DP16491 Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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