| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP16504
|
| DP16504 Subsidy and Taxation in All-Pay Auctions under Incomplete Information |
| Aner Sela; Yizhaq Minchuk
|
| 发表日期 | 2021-09-02
|
| 出版年 | 2021
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study all-pay auctions under incomplete information with n contestants who have non-linear cost functions. The designer may award two kinds of subsidy (taxation): one that decreases (increases) each contestant's marginal cost of effort and another that increases (decreases) each contestant's value of winning. The designer's expected payoff is the contestants' expected total effort minus the cost of subsidy or, alternatively, plus the tax payment. We show that when the resource of subsidy (the marginal taxation rate) is relatively small and the cost function is concave (convex), the designer's expected payoff in all-pay auctions with both kinds of subsidy (taxation) is higher than in the same contest without any subsidy (taxation). We then compare both kinds of subsidy and demonstrate that if the resource of subsidy is relatively small and the cost functions are concave (convex), the cost subsidy is better than prize subsidy for the designer who wishes to maximize his expected payoff. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | All-pay auctions
Subsidy
Taxation
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16504
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545459
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Aner Sela,Yizhaq Minchuk. DP16504 Subsidy and Taxation in All-Pay Auctions under Incomplete Information. 2021.
|
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