| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16509 |
| DP16509 Systemic Implications of the Bail-In Design | |
| Alissa Kleinnijenhuis; Charles A. E. Goodhart; Doyne Farmer | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-09-03 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The 2007-2008 financial crisis forced governments to choose between the unattractive alternatives of either bailing out a systemically important bank (SIB) or allowing it to fail in a disorderly manner. Bail-in has been put forward as an alternative that potentially addresses the too-big-to-fail problem and contagion risk simultaneously. Though its efficacy has been demonstrated for smaller idiosyncratic SIB failures, its ability to maintain stability in cases of large SIB failures and system-wide crises remains untested. This paper's novelty is to assess the financial-stability implications of bail-in design, explicitly accounting for the multi-layered networked nature of the financial system. We present a model of the European financial system that captures five prevailing contagion channels. We demonstrate that it is essential to understand the interaction of multiple contagion mechanisms and that financial institutions other than banks play an important role. Our results indicate that stability hinges on the bank-specific and structural bail-in design. On the one hand, a well-designed bail-in buttresses financial resilience, but on the other hand, an ill-designed bail-in tends to exacerbate financial distress, especially in system-wide crises and when there are large SIB failures. Our analysis suggests that the current bail-in design may be in the region of instability. While policy makers can fix this, the political economy incentives make this unlikely. |
| 主题 | Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Too big to fail Resolution Bail-in Financial crisis Contagion Financial networks Default Systemically important banks Bail-in debt pricing Political economy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16509-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545464 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alissa Kleinnijenhuis,Charles A. E. Goodhart,Doyne Farmer. DP16509 Systemic Implications of the Bail-In Design. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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