| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16531 |
| DP16531 Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection | |
| Andrea Attar; Thomas Mariotti; François Salanié | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-09-09 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies an insurance market on which privately informed consumers can simultaneously trade with several firms operating under a regulation that prohibits cross-subsidies between contracts. The regulated game supports a single equilibrium allocation in which each layer of coverage is fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase it. This competitive allocation cannot be Pareto-improved by a social planner who observes neither consumers' types nor their trades with firms. Public intervention under multiple contracting and adverse selection should thus arguably target firms' pricing strategies, leaving consumers free to choose their preferred amount of coverage. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Insurance markets Regulation Multiple contracting Adverse selection |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16531 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545484 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrea Attar,Thomas Mariotti,François Salanié. DP16531 Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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