G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16543
DP16543 Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective
Laura Doval; Alex Smolin
发表日期2021-09-13
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要We study the payoffs that can arise under some information structure from an interim perspective. There is a set of types distributed according to some prior distribution and a payoff function that assigns a value to each pair of a type and a belief over the types. Any information structure induces an interim payoff profile which describes, for each type, the expected payoff under the information structure conditional on the type. We characterize the set of all interim payoff profiles consistent with some information structure. We illustrate our results through applications.
主题Organizational Economics
关键词Bayesian persuasion Information design Interim payoffs Reputation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16543
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545494
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Laura Doval,Alex Smolin. DP16543 Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective. 2021.
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