| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16548 |
| DP16548 Dealer Funding and Market Liquidity | |
| Max Bruche; John Chi-Fong Kuong | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-09-14 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a model in which dealers intermediate trades between clients and provide immediacy, or, market liquidity. Dealers can exert unobservable search effort to improve the chance of intermediating profitably. This moral-hazard friction impairs dealers’ ability to raise external finance and hence to compete aggressively with each other in providing liquidity. Market liquidity is limited even for safe assets and more so for assets with higher search cost. To alleviate the financing friction, dealers opt to finance with debt and intermediate in several markets simultaneously. Dealer leverage is therefore endogenous and related to variations in liquidity across otherwise unrelated markets. Our results shed light on how post-crisis regulations influence the provision of immediacy in bond markets. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Dealers Market liquidity Immediacy Regulation Optimal contract |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16548 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545499 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Max Bruche,John Chi-Fong Kuong. DP16548 Dealer Funding and Market Liquidity. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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