| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16596 |
| DP16596 Measuring corruption in the field using behavioral games | |
| Alex Armand; Alexander Coutts; Pedro Vicente; Inês Vilela | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Corruption is often harmful for economic development, yet it is difficult to measure due to its illicit nature. We propose a novel corruption game to characterize the interaction between actual political leaders and citizens, and implement it in Northern Mozambique. Contrary to the game-theoretic prediction, both leaders and citizens engage in corruption. Importantly, corruption in the game is correlated with real-world corruption by leaders: citizens send bribes to leaders whom we observe appropriating community money, and these leaders are likely to reciprocate the bribes. In corrupt behavior, we identify an important trust dimension captured by a standard trust game. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Organizational Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Corruption Game Trust Lab-in-the-field Citizen Political leader Incentives Behavior Elite capture |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16596 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545544 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alex Armand,Alexander Coutts,Pedro Vicente,et al. DP16596 Measuring corruption in the field using behavioral games. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
