| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16621 |
| DP16621 Formal insurance and altruism networks | |
| Tizié Bene; Yann Bramoullé; Frédéric Deroïan | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-10-08 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how altruism networks affect the adoption of formal insurance. Agents have private CARA utilities and are embedded in a network of altruistic relationships. Incomes are subject to both a common shock and a large idiosyncratic shock. Agents can adopt formal insurance to cover the common shock. We show that ex-post altruistic transfers induce interdependence in ex-ante adoption decisions. We characterize the Nash equilibria of the insurance adoption game. We show that adoption decisions are substitutes and that the number of adopters is unique in equilibrium. The demand for formal insurance is lower with altruism than without at low prices, but higher at high prices. Remarkably, individual incentives are aligned with social welfare. We extend our analysis to CRRA utilities and to a fixed utility cost of adoption. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16621 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545565 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tizié Bene,Yann Bramoullé,Frédéric Deroïan. DP16621 Formal insurance and altruism networks. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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