| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16678 |
| DP16678 Competition and Misconduct | |
| John Thanassoulis | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-10-30 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Misconduct is widespread; practices such as mis-selling, pump&dump, and money laundering harm counterparties while raising profits. This paper presents a mechanism which can determine what sorts of misconduct can be sustained in competitive equilibrium in concentrated markets, oligopoly settings, and in markets with many small competing firms. The model studied allows general demand and makes a distinction in types of ethical dilemma using current psychological understanding. The paper shows, for example, that markets with many small competing firms are not vulnerable to misconduct if firms respond to entry with niche strategies or if the ethical dilemma draws an emotional response. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16678 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545616 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John Thanassoulis. DP16678 Competition and Misconduct. 2021. |
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