| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16680 |
| DP16680 Misdiagnosing Bank Capital Problems | |
| Jeremy Bulow; Paul Klemperer | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-10-31 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Banks' reluctance to repair their balance sheets, combined with deposit insurance and regulatory forbearance in recognizing greater risks and losses, can lead to solvency problems that look like liquidity (bank-run) crises. Regulatory forbearance incentivizes banks to both retain risky loans and reject new good opportunities. With sufficient regulatory forbearance, partially-insured banks act exactly as if they are fully insured. Stress tests certify that uninsured creditors will be paid, not that banks are solvent, and have ambiguous effects on the efficiency of investment. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bank capital Regulatory capital Capital requirements Regulatory forbearance Bank runs Solvency runs Liquidity runs Stress tests Financial crisis |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16680 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545618 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeremy Bulow,Paul Klemperer. DP16680 Misdiagnosing Bank Capital Problems. 2021. |
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