| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16706 |
| DP16706 Price Discrimination and Big Data: Evidence from a Mobile Puzzle Game | |
| Louis Pape; Christian Helmers; Alessandro Iaria; Stefan Wagner; Julian Runge | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-11-09 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We use a unique dataset from a mobile puzzle game to investigate the welfare consequences of price discrimination. We rely on experimental variation to characterize player behavior and estimate a model of demand for game content. Our counterfactual simulations show that optimal uniform pricing would increase profit by +340% with respect to the game developer’s observed pricing. This is almost the same as the increase in profit associated with first-degree price discrimination (+347%). All pricing strategies considered—including optimal uniform pricing—would induce a transfer of surplus from players to game developer without, however, generating sizeable dead-weight losses. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Price discrimination Personalized pricing Mobile apps Online games Freemium |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16706 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545642 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Louis Pape,Christian Helmers,Alessandro Iaria,et al. DP16706 Price Discrimination and Big Data: Evidence from a Mobile Puzzle Game. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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