| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16707 |
| DP16707 Score Disclosure | |
| Mikhail Drugov | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-11-10 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study verifiable disclosure by a monopolist when the product has multiple quality attributes. We identify an equilibrium in which the firm discloses a score---the average of the qualities---without revealing any further information. While full unraveling is still an equilibrium, it is dominated by the score equilibrium in terms of ex ante as well as ex post profits. Moreover, it is ``defeated'' by the score equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Monopoly Quality uncertainty Verifiable information disclosure Multidimensional types |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16707 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545643 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mikhail Drugov. DP16707 Score Disclosure. 2021. |
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