G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16714
DP16714 A Theory of Socially-Inefficient Patent Holdout
Gerard Llobet; Jorge Padilla
发表日期2021-11-12
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要This paper proposes a framework to analyze holdout in patent licensing negotiations. We show that when the validity of a patent is probabilistic, a potential downstream user has incentives to shun to pay the price offered by a patent holder to license the technology and risk being brought to court. These incentives are exacerbated when jurisdictions are local and the downstream producer can approach courts sequentially. The informational spillovers across trials imply that this firm often finds optimal to go to court aiming to invalidate the patent in a jurisdiction due to the knock-on effect on future jurisdictions. This process results in excessive litigation compared to when the jurisdiction is global. The distortions from sequential litigation are likely to be aggravated when final competition is accounted for or when patent injunctions are not allowed.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Intellectual property Standard setting organizations Patent licensing Patent holdout Global jurisdictions
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16714
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545651
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Gerard Llobet,Jorge Padilla. DP16714 A Theory of Socially-Inefficient Patent Holdout. 2021.
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