| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16735 |
| DP16735 Equilibrium Worker-Firm Allocations and the Deadweight Losses of Taxation | |
| Jesper Bagger; Espen R. Moen; Rune Vejlin | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-11-18 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse the deadweight losses of tax-induced labor misallocation in an equilibrium model of the labour market where workers search to climb a job ladder and firms post vacancies. Workers differ in abilities. Jobs differ in productivities and amenities. A planner uses affine tax functions to finance lump-sum transfers to all workers and unemployment benefits. The competitive search equilibrium maximizes after-tax utility subject to resource constraints and the tax policy. A higher tax rate distorts search effort, job ranking and vacancy creation. Distortions vary on the job ladder, but always result in deadweight losses. We calibrate the model using matched employer-employee data from Denmark. The marginal deadweight loss is 33 percent of the tax base, and primarily arise from distorted search effort and vacancy creation. Steeply rising deadweight losses from distorted vacancy creation imply that the deadweight loss in the calibrated economy exceeds those incurred by very inequality averse social planners. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Deadweight loss Ptimal taxation Redistribution Labour allocation Job search Job ranking Vacancy creation Amenities Matched employer-employee data |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16735 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545670 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jesper Bagger,Espen R. Moen,Rune Vejlin. DP16735 Equilibrium Worker-Firm Allocations and the Deadweight Losses of Taxation. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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