| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16753 |
| DP16753 Price Authority and Information Sharing with Competing Principals | |
| Damien J. Neven; Salvatore Piccolo; Enrique Andreu | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-11-25 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We characterize the degree of price discretion that competing principals award their agents in a framework where the latter are informed about demand, while the former learn it probabilistically and may exchange this information on a reciprocal basis. Partial delegation equilibria exist with and without information sharing and feature binding price caps (list prices) that prevent agents to pass on their distribution costs to consumers. Yet, these equilibria are more likely to occur with information sharing than without. Moreover, while principals exchange information when products are sufficiently differentiated and downstream distribution costs are neither too high nor too low, expected prices are unambiguously lower with than without information sharing. Finally, we also argue why, and how, an information-sharing agreement can be implemented by a simple communication protocol according to which principals disclose their price intentions. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Competing principals Delegates sales Discretion Information sharing List prices |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16753 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545687 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Damien J. Neven,Salvatore Piccolo,Enrique Andreu. DP16753 Price Authority and Information Sharing with Competing Principals. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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