| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16768 |
| DP16768 Organizing Data Analytics | |
| Ricardo Alonso; Odilon Câmara | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-12-02 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theory of credible skepticism in organizations to explain the main trade-offs in organizing data generation, analysis and reporting. In our designer-agent-principal game, the designer selects the information privately observed by the agent who can misreport it at a cost, while the principal can audit the report. We study three organizational levers: tampering prevention, tampering detection and the allocation of the experimental-design task. We show that motivating informative experimentation while discouraging misreporting are often conflicting organizational goals. To incentivize experimentation, the principal foregoes a flawless tampering detection/prevention system and separates the tasks of experimental design and implementation. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Strategic experimentation Bayesian persuasion Tampering Organizational design Information technology Audit |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16768 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545703 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ricardo Alonso,Odilon Câmara. DP16768 Organizing Data Analytics. 2021. |
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