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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP16781 |
DP16781 Larger transfers financed with more progressive taxes? On the optimal design of taxes and transfers | |
Axelle Ferriere; Gaston Navarro; Oliko Vardishvili | |
发表日期 | 2021-12-06 |
出版年 | 2021 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study the optimal joint design of targeted transfers and progressive income taxes. We develop a simple analytical model and demonstrate an optimally negative relation between transfers and income-tax progressivity, due to both efficiency and redistribution concerns. That is, higher transfers should be financed with lower income-tax progressivity. We next quantify the optimal fiscal plan in a rich dynamic model calibrated to the U.S. economy. Transfers should be generous and financed with moderate income-tax progressivity. To redistribute while preserving efficiency, average tax-and-transfer rates should be more progressive than marginal rates. Transfers, even if lump-sum, precisely allow to disentangle average from marginal rates. Targeted transfers further implement non-monotonic marginal rates, but generate only modest additional gains relative to a lump-sum transfer. Quantitatively, the left tail of the income distribution determines the optimal size of the transfer, while the right tail drives the optimal income-tax progressivity. |
主题 | Macroeconomics and Growth |
关键词 | Heterogeneous agents Fiscal policy Optimal taxation Redistribution |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16781 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545714 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Axelle Ferriere,Gaston Navarro,Oliko Vardishvili. DP16781 Larger transfers financed with more progressive taxes? On the optimal design of taxes and transfers. 2021. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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