Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP16800 |
DP16800 On the Efficiency of Large Resale Networks | |
Daniele Condorelli; Andrea Galeotti; Ludovic Renou | |
发表日期 | 2021-12-10 |
出版年 | 2021 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Many goods are allocated via resale networks, reaching their final buyer through a sequence of exchanges. We study a model where a single good is traded by a potentially infinite number of traders who have private valuations for the good and are connected in a random network that determines resale possibilities. Whoever holds the good has bargaining power. We show that large resale networks allocate efficiently in the no-discounting limit, even if resale opportunities are locally-limited. When the network is a stationary random tree, the limiting equilibrium is inefficient if and only if the network is a chain of monopolists. |
主题 | Organizational Economics |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16800 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545730 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniele Condorelli,Andrea Galeotti,Ludovic Renou. DP16800 On the Efficiency of Large Resale Networks. 2021. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。