G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16800
DP16800 On the Efficiency of Large Resale Networks
Daniele Condorelli; Andrea Galeotti; Ludovic Renou
发表日期2021-12-10
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要Many goods are allocated via resale networks, reaching their final buyer through a sequence of exchanges. We study a model where a single good is traded by a potentially infinite number of traders who have private valuations for the good and are connected in a random network that determines resale possibilities. Whoever holds the good has bargaining power. We show that large resale networks allocate efficiently in the no-discounting limit, even if resale opportunities are locally-limited. When the network is a stationary random tree, the limiting equilibrium is inefficient if and only if the network is a chain of monopolists.
主题Organizational Economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16800
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545730
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Daniele Condorelli,Andrea Galeotti,Ludovic Renou. DP16800 On the Efficiency of Large Resale Networks. 2021.
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