| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16801 |
| DP16801 Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk | |
| Alp Atakan; Mehmet Ekmekci; Ludovic Renou | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-12-10 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a cheap-talk game where two experts first choose what information to acquire and then offer advice to a decision-maker whose actions affect the wel- fare of all. The experts cannot commit to reporting strategies. Yet, we show that the decision-maker’s ability to cross-verify the experts’ advice acts as a commit- ment device for the experts. We prove the existence of an equilibrium, where an expert’s equilibrium payoff is equal to what he would obtain if he could commit to truthfully revealing his information. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16801 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545731 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alp Atakan,Mehmet Ekmekci,Ludovic Renou. DP16801 Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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