全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP16807 Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP16807
	DP16807 Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms
	Andrea Attar; Eloisa Campioni; Thomas Mariotti; Alessandro Pavan
发表日期	2021-12-12
出版年	2021
语种	英语
摘要	We study competing-mechanism games, in which several principals contract with several privately informed agents. We show that enabling principals to engage into private disclosures - whereby a principal sends to the agents contractible private signals about how her final decision will respond to the agents' messages - can significantly affect the predictions of such games. Our first result is that equilibrium outcomes and payoffs of games without private disclosures need no longer be supported once private disclosures are allowed for. This challenges the robustness of the folk theorems à la Yamashita (2010). Our second result is that allowing for private disclosures may generate equilibrium outcomes and payoffs that cannot be supported in any game without private disclosures, no matter how rich the message spaces are. This challenges the canonicity of the universal mechanisms of Epstein and Peters (1999). These findings call for a novel approach to the analysis of competing-mechanism games.
主题	Industrial Organization
关键词	Incomplete information Competing mechanisms Private disclosures Folk theorems Universal mechanisms
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp16807
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545737
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Andrea Attar,Eloisa Campioni,Thomas Mariotti,et al. DP16807 Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms. 2021.