G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16826
DP16826 Acquisitions, innovation, and the entrenchment of monopoly
Vincenzo Denicolò; Michele Polo
发表日期2021-12-20
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要We analyze a dynamic model of repeated innovation where inventors may be acquired by an incumbent or else challenge its leadership. In the short run, acquisitions always spur innovation because of the invention-for-buyout effect. In the long-run, however, acquisitions may stifle innovation because of a countervailing effect, the entrenchment of monopoly. The entrenchment-of-monopoly effect arises when the incumbent's dominance depends on its past activity levels and thus is reinforced by repeated acquisitions over time. We show that if the entrenchment-of-monopoly effect is sufficiently strong, forward-looking policymakers should prohibit acquisitions in the anticipation of their long-run negative impact on innovation. This argument provides a new theory of harm that can be used to block acquisitions that might otherwise go unchallenged.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Acquisitions Innovation market power Antitrust policy
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16826
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545752
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Vincenzo Denicolò,Michele Polo. DP16826 Acquisitions, innovation, and the entrenchment of monopoly. 2021.
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