| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16826 |
| DP16826 Acquisitions, innovation, and the entrenchment of monopoly | |
| Vincenzo Denicolò; Michele Polo | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a dynamic model of repeated innovation where inventors may be acquired by an incumbent or else challenge its leadership. In the short run, acquisitions always spur innovation because of the invention-for-buyout effect. In the long-run, however, acquisitions may stifle innovation because of a countervailing effect, the entrenchment of monopoly. The entrenchment-of-monopoly effect arises when the incumbent's dominance depends on its past activity levels and thus is reinforced by repeated acquisitions over time. We show that if the entrenchment-of-monopoly effect is sufficiently strong, forward-looking policymakers should prohibit acquisitions in the anticipation of their long-run negative impact on innovation. This argument provides a new theory of harm that can be used to block acquisitions that might otherwise go unchallenged. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Acquisitions Innovation market power Antitrust policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16826 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545752 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vincenzo Denicolò,Michele Polo. DP16826 Acquisitions, innovation, and the entrenchment of monopoly. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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