| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16832 |
| DP16832 Information Choice in Auctions | |
| Nina Bobkova | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-12-24 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The choice of an auction mechanism influences which object characteristics bidders learn about and whether the object is allocated efficiently. Some object characteristics are valued equally by all bidders and thus are inconsequential for the efficient allocation. Others matter only to certain bidders, and thus determine the bidder with the highest object value. I show that the efficient auction is the second-price auction: it induces bidders to learn exclusively about object characteristics which matter only to them. An independent private value framework arises endogenously. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Information choice Endogeneous interdependence Multidimensional auctions Interdependent values Accuracy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16832 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545757 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nina Bobkova. DP16832 Information Choice in Auctions. 2021. |
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