| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16842 |
| DP16842 The Politics of the Paycheck Protection Program | |
| Thomas Lambert; Prachi Mishra | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-12-27 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the incidence of special interests in the allocation of loans through the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). We find that lobbying at the firm and industry levels helps obtain larger PPP loans during the pandemic. We also observe that PPP lending is more responsive to lobbying in ideologically less conservative areas as well as in industries less affected by the pandemic. Our findings are consistent with the notion that lobbying firms have experience in navigating administrative and policy complexity and can thus benefit more from aid provided under the PPP. |
| 主题 | Political Economy |
| 关键词 | Covid-19 Ideology Lobbying Paycheck protection program |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16842 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545765 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Lambert,Prachi Mishra. DP16842 The Politics of the Paycheck Protection Program. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Thomas Lambert]的文章 |
| [Prachi Mishra]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Thomas Lambert]的文章 |
| [Prachi Mishra]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Thomas Lambert]的文章 |
| [Prachi Mishra]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
