| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16858 |
| DP16858 Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions | |
| Dirk Bergemann; Tibor Heumann; Stephen Morris; Constantine Sorokin; Eyal Winter | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-04 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in the second price auction. The seller faces a classic economic trade-off: providing more information improves the efficiency of the allocation but also creates higher information rents for bidders. The information disclosure policy that maximizes the revenue of the seller is to fully reveal low values (where competition will be high) but to pool high values (where competition will be low). The size of the pool is determined by a critical quantile that is independent of the distribution of values and only dependent on the number of bidders. We discuss how this policy provides a rationale for conflation in digital advertising. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Auctions Second-price auctions Information design Information disclosure Digital advertising Conflation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16858 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545783 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dirk Bergemann,Tibor Heumann,Stephen Morris,et al. DP16858 Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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