G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16863
DP16863 A Fair Day's Pay for a Fair Day's Work: Optimal Tax Design as Redistributional Arbitrage
Christian HELLWIG; Nicolas Werquin
发表日期2022-01-06
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要We study optimal tax design based on the idea that policy-makers face trade-offs between multiple margins of redistribution. Within a Mirrleesian economy with earnings, consumption and retirement savings, we derive a novel formula for optimal non-linear income and savings distortions based on redistributional arbitrage. We establish a sufficient statistics representation of the labor income and capital tax rates on top income earners, which relies on the comparison between the Pareto tails of income and consumption. Because consumption is more evenly distributed than income, it is optimal to shift a substantial fraction of the top earners' tax burden from income to savings. Our results extend to economies with one-dimensional heterogeneity and general preferences over an arbitrary set of commodities.
主题Public Economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16863-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545789
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Christian HELLWIG,Nicolas Werquin. DP16863 A Fair Day's Pay for a Fair Day's Work: Optimal Tax Design as Redistributional Arbitrage. 2022.
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