| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16874 |
| DP16874 Non-bossiness and First-Price Auctions | |
| Marek Pycia; Madhav Raghavan | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-10 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that the first-price auction with no reserve price is the essentially unique mechanism that is non-bossy, individually rational, and efficient in equilibrium. The first-price auction with optimal reserve price is the essentially unique mechanism that is non-bossy, individually rational, and revenue maximizing. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16874 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545801 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marek Pycia,Madhav Raghavan. DP16874 Non-bossiness and First-Price Auctions. 2022. |
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