| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16892 |
| DP16892 Strategic Ignorance and Information Design | |
| Ina Taneva | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-12 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study information design in strategic settings when agents can publicly refuse to view their private signals. The requirement that agents must be willing to view their signals represents additional constraints for the designer, comparable to participation constraints in mechanism design. Ignoring those constraints may lead to substantial divergence between the designer’s intent and actual outcomes, even in the case where the designer seeks to maximize the agents’ payoffs. We characterize implementable distributions over states and actions. Requiring robustness to strategic ignorance undoes two standard information design results: providing information conditional on players’ choices rather than all at once may hurt the designer, and communication between players may help her. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Incomplete information games Information design Robustness Strategic ignorance Bayes correlated equilibrium |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16892 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545820 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ina Taneva. DP16892 Strategic Ignorance and Information Design. 2022. |
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