| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16896 |
| DP16896 Contracting over Persistent Information | |
| Wei ZHAO; Claudio Mezzetti; Ludovic Renou; Tristan Tomala | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-13 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a dynamic principal-agent problem, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of infor- mation. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses the principal’s preferred action. We show that there exists an optimal contract, where the principal stops disclosing information as soon as its most preferred action is a static best reply for the agent, or else con- tinues disclosing information until the agent perfectly learns the principal’s private information. If the agent perfectly learns the state, he learns it in fi- nite time with probability one; the more patient the agent, the later he learns it. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16896 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545827 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wei ZHAO,Claudio Mezzetti,Ludovic Renou,et al. DP16896 Contracting over Persistent Information. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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