| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16901 |
| DP16901 Persuasion Through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation | |
| Florian Hoffmann; Roman Inderst; Marco Ottaviani | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-15 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper characterizes equilibrium persuasion through selective disclosure based on the personal information that senders acquire about the preferences and orientations of receivers, with applications to strategic marketing and campaigning. We derive positive and normative implications depending on: the extent of competition among senders, whether receivers are wary of senders collecting personalized data, and whether firms are able to personalize prices. Privacy laws requiring senders to obtain consent to acquire information are beneficial when there is little or asymmetric competition among senders, when receivers are unwary, and when firms caprice discriminate. Otherwise, policy intervention has unintended negative welfare consequences. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Political Economy |
| 关键词 | Selective disclosure Hypertargeting Limited attention Privacy regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16901 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545833 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Florian Hoffmann,Roman Inderst,Marco Ottaviani. DP16901 Persuasion Through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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