| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16902 |
| DP16902 Bargaining over Royalties in the Shadow of Litigation | |
| Fabian Griem; Roman Inderst | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-15 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We model negotiations over patent royalties in the shadow of litigation through a Nash-in-Nash approach, where outside options, triggered in case of disagreement, are derived from a subsequent game of litigation. The outcome of litigation depends both on "hard determinants", such as relative patent strength, and on "soft determinants", such as parties' efficacy in litigation or their (known) preparedness to disrupt negotiations in favor of litigation. Amongst other things, this has implications for the interpretation of observed royalties in empirical analysis. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Political Economy |
| 关键词 | Royalties Litigation Nash-in-nash |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16902 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545834 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fabian Griem,Roman Inderst. DP16902 Bargaining over Royalties in the Shadow of Litigation. 2022. |
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